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Some safe havens and protected areas are safer than others for internally
displaced persons situated in war zones. The research presented compares three
such areas: the 'safe cities' of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a UN-sanctioned 'preventive
zone' in Southern Somalia, and an 'open relief centre' in Northern Sri Lanka.
Each of these safe spaces has distinct political antecedents, peacekeeping
components, and histories prior to war that have shaped the success of such
areas in protecting people during conflict. In comparing the safety and well-being
of displaced civilians in the three countries, the importance of consent by warring
parties to the international designation of safe spaoe emerges as critical. The
authorization of a chosen safe area, by the UN Security Council or by warring
factions, plays an important role in relation to its efficacy.The research presented
suggests that zones of peace and protected areas cannot solely be enforced by
international peacekeepers, but must be negotiated at a political level.
At the time of writing this paper, the city of Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina
marks the seventh anniversary of the massacre there in July 1995. After more
than a decade of conflict in Somalia, instability continues and has been fuelled
anew since September I I 2001 with allegations that Al-Qaeda cells may be based
in the country. The Sri Lankan Government, after two decades ofwar, is moving
extremely cautiously towards peace negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Vellupillai Prabhakaran. What, if anything, do
these disparate parts of the world have in common, except for the legacies of
war? All have been sites of experiment in which different kinds of safe spaces
were created to protect displaced persons within their home countries. Some
fared better than others, though the distinctive circumstances precipitating each
crisis and the specific safe space implemented are not strictly comparable. This
article attempts to trace the antecedents and outcomes of each of these spaces,
acknowledging that all are part of a strategy of de facto containment that
characterizes humanitarian responses since the early 1990s (Frelick 1993;
Hyndman 2000; Duffield 2002). It is argued here that the historical connotations
of places designated as safe by international bodies are critical to their success,
raising obvious questions about the concept of enforced safe spaces. Not
surprisingly, internationally ascribed safe areas designated for civilians in war
zones are most likely to work where first, warring factions consent to them; and
second, the designated area has local connotations of sanctuary or safety. These
basic conditions have not always been met (Outram l9g7).
Safe spaces, as internationally-sanctioned zones of protection for displaced
civilians, are a reasonably recent, post-Cold War phenomenon. In 1991, the
UN Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq was the first UN-sanctioned
international intervention into a sovereign state. Some 400,000 Iraqi Kurds,
fleeing the violence of Saddam Hussein's forces, approached the Turkish
border where they were not welcome. In an unprecedented move, the uN
Security Council passed Resolution 688 creating a 'safe haven' in Northern
Iraq. Protected by international peacekeepers on the ground, and a 'no fly
zone'in the air space above, Operation Provide Comfort was-in hindsight-
probably the most effective of the safe haven attempts undertaken. After this
initial foray, 'the standard of safety in such zones steadily declined' (Frelick
1999: 24). From Iraq to Haiti to Rwanda, distinct safe areas have been
deployed with disparate results and to different ends. If safe spaces are more
'rhetoric than reality' (Frelick 1999: 25) as some critics claim, why have they
been used so often by international bodies mediating the consequences of war?
why are some safe areas more effective than others? what political, legal, and
geographical dimensions generate such spaces?
This paper analyses the meanings, outcomes, and geographies of three
distinct safe spaces in somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sri Lanka. Each of
these sites is situated within a unique context of war; the historical and
geographical contingencies of conflict must be considered in any comparison
among them. The humanitarian discourse of 'preventive protection' and 'the
right to remain' has generated many, but not all, of the safe spaces within
conflict areas in the 1990s. This language of humanitarian assistance emerged
as a highly spatialized project of reorienting human displacement closer to
home (Hyndman 2000). Since the UN intervention in Iraq, crossing an
international border and claiming asylum as a refugee is no longer the only way
to receive assistance or protection from the international humanitarian regime.In this new millennium, both humanitarian and development aid are
increasingly deployed at or near sites of conflict:
Rather than patronize Third World political entities the trend today is to join
metropolitan public*private humanitarian alliances and aid regimes designed to
contain and neutralize what is now interpreted as intemational stability. From
support, the trend is towards containment, management and eradication (Duffield
2002:76).
The meaning of 'refugee' has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold
War, and its value in geopolitical terms has clearly declined. Where refugees
once provided proof of Western superiority in the rivalry with the USSR, they
are increasingly considered more of a liability when they cross international
borders. Political support for hosting refugees has reached its limits among
many governments in countries receiving asylum seekers. As Newland (1999:
17) notes, 'a determination was made to bring safety to people rather than
people to safety, by force if necessary'. The strategy of helping people internally
displaced within their home countries is both a political and practical one that
has met with mixed results. One goal of this paper, then, is to trace the way in
which these safe areas have been established, ascertain their actual safety, and
determine why some are more effective than others. Whether the safe areas are
predicated on legal or political grounds, and at local or international scales,
will appear to make all the difference.
The analysis presented is not strictly comparative, that is, the approaches
taken to glean insights about each of these sites were distinct as were their
political circumstances. Field visits to safe areas in Somalia, Sri Lanka, and
Bosnia took place over a period of seven years, under different circumstances
of war and peace, and in different research capacities. My access to these areas
varied considerably. In Somalia in 1993,I worked for UNHCR as a field officer
for the Cross-Border Operation based in the'preventive zone'in the southern
(Bai-Gedo) region of the country, returning again to the region in 1994-1995 as
a researcher. In 1999, my fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina was circumscribed
by the aftermath of the NATO bombing in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. As someone from a NATO country, I did not visit Srebrenica,
located in what is now the predominantly Serb, Republika Srpska. I focused
my fieldwork instead in Sarajevo and Gorazde. In Sri Lanka, my work on a
separate research project took me through much of the northern and eastern
parts of the country, including to Madhu. The information analysed in the
paper derives from field notes made during visits to each of these locations
based on interviews with local staff in UN agencies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and other contacts. I also analyse newspaper reports,
evaluations of operations, and a number of secondary sources.
Safe Spaces as Strategic
The 1990s witnessed a respatialization of responses to crises of human
displacement. Solutions that addressed the problem as close to home as
possible were preferred for both political and economic reasons. The major
players in this tegime, namely donor governments of the most industrialized
countries, shifted their emphasis from 'the right to leave' one's country in the
face of persecution or violence to 'the right to remain'. Displaced people were,
and still are in many cases, encouraged to stay within their countries of origin
by providing assistance to them there, rather than having them seek protection
through asylum across an international border. Some policy analysts contend
that the concept violates the right to leave one's country and to seek asylum as
outlined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Others argue that several of
these safe havens or protected zones have not been safe at all. 'New spatial
categories, like the concept of Safety Zones, must therefore necessarily be
deconstructed in the matrix of changing configurations of material and social
processes' (Chimni 1995: 823).
Srebrenica, a mainly Muslim town in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, was
designated a 'safe haven' by the UN Security Council in a resolution passed on
16 April 1993. The Security Council added five more 'safe areas', all with
predominantly Muslim populations, in a second resolution on 6 May 1993. A
third resolution, passed on 4 June 1993, authorized air strikes to protect the six
areas' UN defenders. Despite these measures, Bosnian Serb forces entered
Srebrenica in July 1995, following which some 7,000-8,000 Muslims, mainly
men or boys, were murdered. Unlike the safe havens of Sarajevo, Gorazde, and
Bihac which had large Bosnian army forces, Srebrenica was mostly
demilitarized. Consequently, Serbs were able to take over the town with little
resistance. The small battalion of Dutch peacekeepers left the town when their
air cover did not arrive, and they realized the futility of their presence (HINA
news agency 1998).
By the end of the decade's experiments in safe areas, experts in humanitarian
law and operations articulated incisive questions about the viability of such
protected zones, yet they had few answers. Sergio Vieira de Mello, then Under-
Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs at the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and recently appointed UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted that the idea of protected areas
raises as many questions as it appears to resolve. Such questions include:
-Whether the idea of establishing a protected area based on consent isrealistic?
- 
Whether the establishment of a protected area using international force can
be effective?
-Whether the creation of such areas might contribute (unwittingly) to ethniccleansing?
-To what extent the creation of a protected area undermines the right toasylum?
-To what extent might the creation of such an area permanently influenceinternational borders?
-To what extent does the construction of such an area affect the treatment ofcivilians outside the area? (UN OCHA 1999:2)
What is most interesting about these questions is that they could only be asked
in hindsight, after experiments in deploying safe spaces had been tried with
mixed results. If these questions could have been posed and answered at the
beginning of the 1990s, the pattern of humanitarian response might well have
looked very different.
The shift in discourse from'the right to leave'and 'the right to seek asylum'
to 'the right to remain' generated a set of safe areas within conflict-affected
areas. These came into being as a result of UN Security Council resolutions
during the 1990s that contested the idea that sovereignty is sacrosanct where
governments fail to protect the basic rights and safety of certain groups of
citizens. 'Preventive protection' designates a set of highly spatialized manage-
ment practices for people out of place, literally those forced to flee their homes.
While the establishment of 'safe havens' for lraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq in
l99l is said to mark this turning point, 'open relief centres' for would-be Sri
Lankan refugees, and 'safe corridors' to Muslim enclaves in Bosnia, have also
been an expression of this respatialization of humanitarian response.
Humanitarian law as codified in the Geneva Conventions has long defined
another set of safe spaces, including hospitals for combatants and agreed
treatment for prisoners of war. Other, equally conventional safe spaces, namely
refugee camps, have also played an important role in providing sanctuary for
displaced persons, though even the safety of camps has come under question
since the Rwanda genocide of 1994.t
UN Perspectives on Safe Areas
The expert consultation organized by OCHA and the Harvard Center for
Population and Development Studies in February 1999 generated important
insights and new terminology around the concept of safe spaces. From the
outset, the geographical and historical contingency of protection was
identified: 'The concept of protection was recognized to be sensitive to
elements of place (i.e., terrain, climate, geographic location) size (i.e.,
population, spatial area), time (i.e., duration, stage of conflict) and overlapping
regulatory regimes' (UN OCHA 1999: 5). Despite this important introductory
observation, little genuine analysis of the local political context of safe areas
was undertaken. Rather, a familiar debate between advocates of humanitarian
law versus those of humanitarian operations authorized by the UN Security
Council resolutions ensued. This tension between legal and political
approaches to complex emergencies had the effect of foreclosing debate
around these seemingly mutually exclusive options.
At the consultation, the very meaning of humanitarian protection was
debated at length, with participants citing competing references to prevention in
humanitarian law and in practice (UN OCHA 1999). Preventive protection
defined in relation to international humanitarian law is contractual and based
on consent by warring parties that agree to render designated areas of medical
treatment 'offlimits.' In contrast, preventive protection in the operational sense
has referred to the designation of safe spaces by UN authorities enforced by
military power, usually in the fonn of peacekeepers. This distinction between
consensual'protected zones', based in international humanitarian law, and'safe
areas', specified by the UN Security Council but not necessarily agreed to by
warring factions, is a crucial one. The participants in the consultation
determined that consensual safe areas should be called 'humanitarian zones'
and the UN-designated sites 'security zones', a tenninology that suggests a
distinction between legal and politically-driven safe areas. Yet, as before, there
is little recognition of local patterns of protection or customary places of
sanctuary. Protection in both the legal and political sense is assumed to be the
domain of warring parties, international actors and instruments. The experts
recognized 'the need to "manage" consent and to try to preempt its erosion or
withdrawal' (UN OCHA 1999: l8).2 A more comprehensive consultation with
civil society actors, as difficult as it might be in a war zone, might have generated
valuable and innovative insights.3
This top-down approach to protection excludes local information, such as
historical patterns of dealing with insecurity and the meanings attached to
particular sites in an area of displacement. An approach that attends to the
cultural politics, geopolitics, and history of a place emerges between these legal
and political approaches. Civilian protection during war cannot rely solely
upon contractual legal obligations forged on an international scale, nor can the
security of states prevail over the security of people if genuine protection is the
aim. civilian security involves a finer scale of analysis and action, and a
broader sense of what constitutes security (DFAIT 2000). The geopolitical
context and historical relation of particular groups to specific areas was not
part of the puzzle experts addressed when they took inventory of UN protected
areas, although they did identify as a topic for further study the 'need to
explore ad hoc consensual solutions outside the traditional normative
framework, 
€.9., Open Relief Centers in Sri Lanka' (UN OCHA 1999: l8).
Of the safe areas covered here, the most controversial has been the setting up
of the UN-protected areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In retrosp@t, it is ironic
that UN authorities were able to achieve a negotiated agreement with the
Bosnian Serbs on Srebrenica as a'safe'city, but not on Sarajevo and Gorazde.
In practice, this form of agreement meant little: Srebrenica was attacked and
much of its male population massacred. Sarajevo and Gorazde were also hit
hard, but were able to stave off the offensives more successfully due to more
sizeable fighting forces. The experts at the February 1999 meeting agreed that
the 'safe city' tactic should be a strategy of last resort in locations where no
trust or respect for international humanitarian law can be established. Security
zones are not economically feasible; generate unavoidable dependency on
international assistance; and have the potential to create 'a largely vacant
landscape dotted with small, unsustainable protected areas' (DFAIT 2000: 8).
Concern was voiced that protected areas were represented as 'empty spaces'
that failed to take account of the socio-political relations and organizations of
civil society in situ. Such mapping practices echo imperial cartographies that
have long served to obfuscate the presence of (indigenous) peoples and the
political importance of their struggles (Sparke 1995; Harley l99Z'1.
Adding further to the critique of safety (or security) zones, chimni (1995)
examines the deployment of the first such safe space authorized by the UN
Security Council in Iraq during the l99l displacement of Kurdish Iraqis. Not
only did the Security Council exceed its authority in passing resolution 688,
which established the safe havens, but the resolution 'served to legitimize
Turkey's decision to close its border and [. . ..1 an undesirable precedent had
thereby been set' (Suhrke cited in Chimni 1995: 837). In coming to the aid of
Turkey, which faced the prospect of a sizeable and undesirable Kurdish refugee
population, the Western coalition demonstrated solidarity with its geopolitical
ally as much as it assisted the would-be refugees as internally displaced persons
inside Northern lraq. Having said this, the safe havens in Iraq were the most
successful of the security zone experiments that took place in the 1990s.
The next section turns to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the experiment in safe
spaces went seriously awry. It traces the terrain of conflict and displa@ment,
the politicization of the humanitarian project, and the violation of protection
provided by the safe haven of Srebrenica in particular.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Between 1992 and 1995, brutal and systematic campaigns of ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia displaced more than half the population (Cutts 1999). By the end of the
war, almost a million people were refugees in other countries while 1.3 million
people, out of the area's pre-war population of 4.3 million, were internally
displaced. Subsequently, hundreds of thousands of people became dependent
on humanitarian aid, especially in the designated safe havens where flight to
these cities and towns left large parts of the countryside abandoned.
The causes of the war are much more difficult to recite, and a comprehensive
treatment of its dynamics is precluded here. However, claims to the territory of
Bosnia-Herzegovina took on a renewed urgency after the European Union
recognized the secession of the republics of Slovenia and Croatia from the state
of Yugoslavia in 1991. Bosnia-Herzegovina had little choice but to declare its
own independence from Belgrade. It would have otherwise become a largely
non-Serbian republic within an increasingly Serb-dominated federation, or it
would have to accept the division of Bosnia between Serbs and Croats, as
proposed by their respective leaders. Bosnia's ethnic composition before the
war was approximately 44 per cent Muslim, 3l per cent Serb, l7 per cent
Croat, and 6 per cent Yugoslav with a small residual population (Campbell
1999).4 Bosnia's declaration of independence was, of course, contested by the
Serb-dominated army of Yugoslavia under the control of Slobodan Milosevic
and by the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudman; over 60 per cent of
Yugoslavia's military industries were based in Bosnia, 60 per cent of which
were located in Croat or Muslim regions (Glenny 1992: 150). Croats and Serbs
continued to fight by proxy in and over Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Glenny
explains:
The essential problem of a Yugoslav state lies in the numerical and political
dominance of Serbs over Croats; the essential problem of a Croatian state lies in
the numerical and political dominance of Croats over Serbs. In order to secure
peace in the Balkans, this conundrum must be solved along with two others: the
constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Serbia, the political status of the
Moslem, Albanian and Hungarian minorities in the Sandzak, Kosovo and
Vojvodina, respectively (1992: 100).
According to Glenny, the end of Bosnia began on the weekend of I March
1992 when the European Union announced that its independence would be
recognized.
Between May 1992 and November 1995, the uN security council passed 46
resolutions concerning the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cutts 1999). What
is significant about the establishment of the safe cities is that the 'host' state
endorsed the proposal (Chimni 1995). The fledgling state's aim was to maintain
as many people as possible to oppose Serb aggression and to keep the Bosnian
economy afloat by retaining productive Bosnians in the country. As Chimni
(1995) asks, in reference to state endorsement of the safe cities, does a state
have the right to prevent people from fleeing persecution beyond the borders of
the state even when the objective is the survival of the state? This question
highlights the divergence in interests between the security of precarious,
emerging states and the security (or protection) of their citizens. The interests
of states clearly prevailed in this case, although the Security Council did
authorize both humanitarian and peacekeeping missions to Bosnia to ensure
the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance. The UN Protection
Force, uNPRoFoR, was assigned as the peacekeeping mission to Bosnia,
while UNHCR was designated the lead agency for humanitarian operations.
This was the first time that UNHCR had worked directly in a conflict zone
(Cunliffe and Pugh 1997).
Two UN Security Council resolutions (824 and 836) created the basis for the
'safe areas' of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac. All of
these centres hosted a majority Bosnian Muslim population, but cities like
Tuzla and Sarajevo were renowned for their multi-ethnic character. According
to a UNHCR contact, this mixing of cultures has changed dramatically. Post-
war Sarajevo is 80 per cent Muslim, 5 per cent Croat, and 15 per cent Serb.
Bihac, a mainly Muslim town located in the northwest corner of Bosnia, was
surrounded by Serb-held territory before the war, but the selection of Bihac as
a protected area belies an important political history. The Bihac-Cazin region
has long featured a Muslim enclave amid a largely Serb population which
straddles both Bosnian and Croatian territory. Prior to the war, an alliance
between Muslims and Serbs existed here since World War II. Bihac proved to
be one of the safer UN protected areas during the war, despite it becoming the
capital of Bosnian Serb nationalism.
Sampljng Safe Cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina
ln 1994, a market massacre in Sarajevo in February was followed by a major
Serb offensive in Gorazde in April, this despite the'safe city'designation. The
siege of Sarajevo has become seared in the minds of many, thanks to extensive
media coverage of the violence. Michael Winterbottom's 1997 film, Welcome to
sarajevo, captures the gendered spaces of brutality, borrowing from live
footage shot during the war. It illuminates the rape camps in which men from
enemy ethnic groups raped women and then forced them to carry the
pregnancies; prison camps in which men of fighting age were literally starved;
and underground spaces where other men of fighting age hid from the
authorities and the prospect of conscription into a senseless war. Scores of
people died along 'sniper's alley' and throughout the city, even during
Sarajevo's tenure as a UN-designated'safe city.'
From the start, the concept of the safe cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
criticized on the grounds that by concentrating vulnerable civilians in specified
cities, the UN unwittingly created a target for aggressors and participated in a
humanitarian exercise that inadvertently ethnically cleansed large tracts of
rural territory now available to these same aggressors. Not until July 1995 was
it fully evident that the flawed concept of safe cities could be equally flawed and
even fatal in terms of the practical protectionit could afford displaced civilians.
As noted, Srebrenica is the most notorious and was the most dangerous UN-
designated 'safe space'. It is also the least normalized of all the former safe
cities in post-conflict Bosnia. Local (Serb) authorities in Srebrenica (now
located in Republika Srpska) have refused to allow Bosniaks (Bosnian
Muslims) back into Srebrenica, a town once 95 per cent Muslim and 5 per cent
Serb. In June 1999, local Serb nationalists finally allowed the majority Muslim
town council, elected more than two years before in absentia, to take office
(Rhode 1999). Bowing to international pressure and local economic realities,
Serbian nationalists have nonetheless used endless negotiations, administrative
bureaucracy, rock-throwing, and other tactics to prevent the Muslim town
councillors from meeting and to prevent Muslim refugees from returning to
their homes. Most of the 12,000 Serbs who inhabit Srebrenica are refugees
from Sarajevo, the city that ironically hosts most of the refugees who survived
Srebrenica. Because of a multi-year embargo by the US and EU nations, most
international aid has bypassed Srebrenica in response to Serb recalcitrance.
The return process is fraught not only with insecurity for those returning as
minorities, but also the fear of unemployment and increased poverty (Hovey
2001). Unemployment among people of minority backgrounds far exceeds the
national average of 4S{0 per cent.
In the broader national context of Bosnia, two critical sets of conditions
served to destabilize the safe cities of Bosnia. First, 'UNPROFOR was
singularly unsuccessful at improving access for humanitarian organizations to
the government enclaves which were besieged by Bosnian Serb authorities'
(Cutts 1999: 9). Mark Cutts, who was Head of the UNHCR office in Sarajevo
during much of the war, explains that this arrangement was the outcome of an
arrangement in which UNPROFOR itself depended entirely on authorization
from the Bosnian Serb authorities to travel through its territory. Thus,
permission to travel to the safe areas in order to protect displaced civilians was
sought from the very forces who threatened their safety. When Bosnian Serbs
cut off humanitarian access to Sarajevo, food and medical supplies fell to
dangerously low levels, despite the UN airlift.s '[A]ssistance was in fact
provided on the basis of accesstbility rather than on the basis of needs' (Cutts
1999: 25; emphasis in original).
Second, while UNPROFOR's peacekeeping position was less than optimal,
UNHCR's humanitarian mission also encountered problems detrimental to the
safe areas. As the lead civilian agency, UNHCR became politicized by forces
beyond its control. Technically an apolitical agency, UNHCR's role in the
conflict was increasingly seen as political rather than humanitarian as it
negotiated the proportional distribution of humanitarian goods and appeared,
at times, to be in charge of protecting Bosnian Muslims. 'This process [of
politicization] was compounded in three ways: the absence of international
political will; the financial and political pressures imposed upon UNHCR's
operational environment; and the blurring of the humanitarian and military
operations'(Cunliffe and Pugh 1997: 137-138). Given UNPROFOR's reliance
on Serb officials for permission to travel, UNHCR's reliance on UNPROFOR
for aid convoys meant that it fell prey to similar problems. All these pressures
'have coincided with emphasis upon "country of origin solutions" to eradicate
the causes of refugee flight' (pp. lal-I42). Not only did UNHCR have limited
direct representation in the UN protected areas, but the agency could not
ensure the protection of basic rights and had little control over the physical
protection of civilians in the region. Ethnic cleansing proved to be one of the
biggest conundrums for UNHCR. Could they evacuate civilians who were
under threat but who had not yet fled? Or was that aiding and abetting the
enemy by helping it to ethnically cleanse the areas under siege? 'While
UNHCR was able to deliver large quantities of humanitarian supplies during
the war, it was rnuch less successful in carrying out its protection mandate'
(Cutts 1999: 16). The provision of humanitarian assistance substituted for
protection.
Somalia
In January l99l Somalian President Siad Barre was ousted from power. By
1992, civil conflict had become widespread and had induced famine in several
parts of the country. Images of malnourished Somalians appeared on
televisions worldwide, winning public sympathy and government donations
to fund humanitarian efforts in both Somalia and Kenya. A series of refugee
camps and temporary border sites were established in Kenya to accommodate
Somalians as they crossed the border, most in desperate physical condition.
Mortality rates soared in these ill-prepared makeshift camps until water
quality, sanitation conditions, and food supplies could be stabilized.
In December 1992, the US-led Operation Restore Hope landed in Somalia,
ostensibly to save the country from itself. Perhaps the most vivid testimony of
prevention was the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 794 which
authorized a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) of thousands of peacekeeping
troops to enter Somalia so that relief supplies could be safely delivered.
'Operation Restore Hope', as the mission was called, was the first peacekeeping
operation which intervened in a sovereign member state when that state did not
present a military threat to its neighbours (Makinda 1993). This move
challenged the sovereignty of states by entering a country in the absence of an
external threat. Somalian society was portrayed as an anarchy imploding on
itself, and humanitarian need was considered grave enough to warrant
multilateral intervention (Shohat and Stam 1994). Operation Restore Hope
provided the peacekeepers and military presence ne@ssary for the establish-
ment of the preventive zone. The initial UNITAF forces were replaced by UN
(UNOSOM II) forces in May 1993.
The 'preventive zone' established in Somalia was at once a UN Security
Council invention and a political panacea.The establishment of a preventive
zone inside Somalia was part of a larger mission, the Cross-Border Operation
(CBO), instigated late in 1992 and 'aimed at preventing new refugees and
facilitating repatriation'(Kirkby et al.1997: l8l). The CBO was in large part a
response to the threats of Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, whose re-
election in December 1992 provided a political platform from which to
announoe the Kenyan Government's plan to return Somalian refugees-by
whatever means necessary-to their country. UNHCR-sponsored refugee
camps in Kenya at the time hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees, but
IINHCR's work with refugees relied on the permission of the Kenyan
Government. As the space in which UNHCR could operate within Kenya
began to shrink, sustained efforts were made to fund an alternative'preventive'
path within Southern Somalia (Hyndman 2000). Thus, the preventive zone had
a humanitarian purpose, but was produced by political exigency and a desire to
repatriate refugees. At the request of the UN Secretary-General, UNHCR
initiated the CBO based on the concept of a preventive zone, previously used in
Afghanistan and Cambodia (Kirkby et al. 1997). Its purpose was to stem the
flow of refugees from Somalia to Kenya and to entice those refugees already in
Kenya to come home.
Four UNHCR 'outposts', administered from Nairobi, were established at
various locations roughly one hundred miles from the Kenya-Somalia border,
as part of the CBO. The working assumption of the outposts was clear:
presence equals protection. By establishing UNHCR offices and providing
international civilian staff to complement the UNITAF peacekeepers, the UN
believed that it created a safe area for refugee repatriation. It eventually
became clear that Southern Somalia was not simply the safely patrolled place
and 'preventive zone' that it had been designated. Mere presence did little to
convince Somalian refugees in Kenya that it was safe to return. By June 1993,
some 12,000 Somalian refugees had returned with the help of UNHCR, but the
vast majority remained in Kenyan camps (UNHCR 1993).
Humanitarian operations in both Somalia and Bosnia deployed peace-
keepers to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. This served to blur the
distinction between military and civilian humanitarian operations. On 5 June
1993, a UN vehicle carrying 14 peacekeepers was ambushed by the forces of
Mohammed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu, the Somalian capital. When US
helicopters then began shooting on Mogadishu in an effort to find or kill
Mohammed Farah Aideed, no UN employee-whether peacekeeper or aid
worker-was safe. Nor was the notion of 'peacekeeping' any longer applicable.
UN forces killed Somalian civilians in the attacks, provoking threats of revenge
from Aideed supporters. Confrontation between UN and Aideed forces in
Mogadishu damaged the UN reputation of neutrality and hastened the
peacekeepers' departure. By the end of March 1995, almost all peacekeepers
had left Somalia, leaving more than 150,000 Somali refugees in Kenyan camps.
While UNHCR designated and mapped the preventive zone as a safe space, the
majority of Somali refugees in Kenya stayed put. As in Srebrenica, there was a
crucial difference between UN intent and people's perceptions of safety on the
ground.
Sri Lanka
War between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka's armed forces has
been raging for twenty years. During the 1983 pogroms, thousands of Tamils in
Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital, were murdered, had their property looted
and homes burned. The pogroms were retaliation for the killing of thirteen
highly ranking (Sinhalese) Sri Lankan soldiers by the LTTE, on the Jaffna
Peninsula. The conflict has spawned large-scale displacement within the
country and well beyond its borders, where a significant Tamil diaspora has
emerged. Statistics suggest that there are more than 800,000 internally
displaced penions (Refugee Council 2002). The death toll now exceeds
60,000. Mass displacement, multiple displacements, long-term displacement,
and attacks on commuirities of displaced persons amid intense militarization
across the country present massive challenges to both national and
international organizations positioned to address the human needs they
generate. Displaced persons exist on both sides of these lines, and encompass
Tamil, Sinhala, and Muslim groups, though the vast majority of displaced
persons in Sri Lanka are Tamil.
If Northern Iraq's Operation Provide Comfort in l99l was the first UN
Security Council-sanctioned space, it was preceded by a lesser known set of
UNdesignated safe spaces called 'open relief centres' (ORCs), created by
UNHCR in Sri Lanka in November 1990. The idea of a'safe haven', based on
humanitarian legal nonns of demilitarized space, to be located on Mannar
Island, the closest geographical point to Southern India, was rejected.
However, 'the much less ambitious and more pragmatic system of Open
Relief Centres' was endorsed as something of an experiment in providing
alternatives to formal asylum (Clarance cited in Chimni 1995: 845). Situated in
Mannar District in Northern Sri Lanka, three ORCs were established and still
operate in the country. Madhu ORC is situated in close proximity to
Palimpiddy ORC (about 5 km north of Madhu); the Pesalai ORC is located on
Mannar Island. At the time of their establishment, the first two were located in
LTTE-held territory and the latter in a government-held area (Clarance 1993).
The largest of the three, located at Madhu, is the focus of the discussion that
follows.
Madhu has quietly provided sanctuary for those displaced from the war over
the past dozen years. This ORC was established at the site of an existing
Catholic shrine and sanctuary at Madhu, and declared a 'neutral peace zorre'
by UNHCR at its inception. In an unusual administrative arrangement, the
space is officially administered by the church under UNHCR's supervision
(Jeyaraj 1999). The ORC was initially conceived of as a temporary place where
displaced people on the move could'freely enter or leave and obtain essential
relief assistance in a relatively safe environment' (Athas 1999). Like safe areas
in Bosnia and Somalia, the ORC exists as an island of civilian safety and
purveyor of material assistance in conditions of war. Unlike the protected areas
of Bosnia and Somalia, the ORC at Madhu is a politically neutral space, one
which prohibits any weapons or military uniforms or rebel fatigues on site, and
one without an international peacekeeping force. From the outset, Madhu and
its counterpart ORCs were praised by the British Refugee Council as 'a genuine
place of safety in the North' (cited in Clarance 1993: 590). The US Comrnittee
for Refugees reported that 'the protection available to displaced persons in the
ORCs still is substantially better than anything else to be found in the
northeast'(cited in Chimni 1995: 847). The ORCs provided a safe alternative to
the camps in Tamil Nadu. In the words of UNHCR's Representative in Sri
Lanka at the time, Bill Clarance (1993: 591), 'the Sri Lankan experience helped
establish the conceptual and practical basis for UNHCR intervention in
situations of conflict which were actually or potentially refugee producing'.
The war in Sri Lanka did generate a role for peacekeepers, albeit not a IIN-
sanctioned one. In 1987, after an accord was reached between the Indian and
Sri Lankan governments (one which excluded Tamil political leaders and
militant groups like the LTTE), Indian peacekeepers arrived in Northern Sri
Lanka to monitor peace and to disarm Tamil militants. 'In theory, the Accord
was meant to solve the ethnic conflict. In practice, it was meant to establish
Indian hegemony over Sri Lanka' (Institute of Agriculture and Women in
Development 1995: 55). The introduction of Indian peacekeepers proved an
unpopular move on both sides of the ethnic divide. While the ORC at Madhu
was unaffected, fighting ensued between Indian peacekeeping forces and the
LTTE until 1990 when the peacekeepers withdrew (p. 55).
What distinguishes the ORC in Northern Sri Lanka from the safe cities of
Bosnia and the preventive zone of Somalia are two factors: first, its
demilitarized character at the front line of the war and yet its inception
outside the rubric of humanitarian law; and second, local consensus among
warring factions on its identity as a safe arca before UNHCR arrived. The
Catholic shrine and church at Madhu is the most sacred in the country
@erera 1998). In 1544, Catholic converts from Mannar Island fled to the
Madhu area, following the massacre of some 600 Catholics by the Hindu king
of Jaffna. Only a small group, who escaped with a wooden statue of the
Virgin Mary, made it safely to Madhu. In the eyes of the survivors, the statue
had saved their lives. They erected a church at Madhu, which has becorne a
sacred site of pilgrimage for Catholics of all ethnic backgrounds ever since
(Perera 1998). In 1982, 250,000 Catholic Sinhalese and 150,000 Catholic
Tamils made the pilgrimage to Madhu for the annual festivals. 'Linguistic
identities of Sinhala and Tamils were overwhelmed by the over arching feeling
of being Christian and Madhu was one place where the ethnic divide was
virtually non-existent' (Jeyaraj 1999). When UNHCR landed in Madhu and
established a 'zon.e of peace,' they did so with a tradition of 450 years of
sanctuary behind them.
The Church allows no anns on the premises of the 400 acre site. The militant
rebel group fighting for an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka, the LTTE,
obliged the Church by agreeing not to recruit members for its cause on
the premises. Initially, the LTTE attempted to bear arms in the camp, tax the
people to raise funds for its cause, and search for recruits among the
population, but'patiently and quietly the Catholic authorities negotiated with
them' (Perera 1999). For more than twelve years, thousands of refugees of
different religious backgrounds have lived relatively securely in the ORC, as the
conflict in Sri Lanka waxed and waned.
After almost a decade as a 'zone of peace,' however, the open relief centre at
Madhu was captured by the Sri Lankan military forces during Operation Rana
Gosa [Battle Cry] II on 22 March 1999. In 1999, Madhu was 'cleared' by the
government in two senses of the word: first, it took control of the territory,
ostensibly from the LTTE, although Madhu had been a sanctuary from both
the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) soldiers and LTIE rebels; and second,
government forces emptied the camp of thousands of displaoed persons, as
noted. The government declared that it had'liberated'Madhu, though Madhu
was never occupied by the LTTE. 'Like the Vatican in Italy Madhu Church
premises were an oasis of Independence in a desert of LTTE control' (Jeyeraj
1999). The ORC was transformed from a demilitarized neutral space
surrounded by LTTE-controlled territory to an armed site under SLA control.
With the church grounds occupied, many feared that it would become a target
of LTTE attack, thereby increasing insecurity rather than ensuring protection.
When church officials objected to uniformed soldiers on the premises, it was
explained that they had no change of clothes. Later when the Bishop of
Mannar complained to the Sri Lankan president, Chandrika Kumaratunga,
she assured him that their presence was only temponry (The Sunday l*ader
1999). They were still there on 3 May 1999 when the Defence Minister came to
Madhu and declared that it had to be emptied by the end of the month(UNHCR 1999). Without consultation with UNHCR, Madhu was emptied in
less than three weeks.6 By the end of May, some 4,000 displaced persons were
shipped to Jaffna and the remainder relocated to other facilities for the
displaced. Although UNHCR reported that houses were 'disassembled' after
the refugees left, personal observations in June 1999 confirrned that many
homes were burnt and most had lost their roofs.
In November 1999, fighting in the area heightened, and more than 3,500
people sought refuge again in Madhu, but for a short time the shrine ceased to
be safe by all accounts. It became the target of both LTTE and army shelling,
which killed more than 35 civilians inside the Church grounds. The LTTE
regained control of the surrounding area once again, and by July 2000, Madhu
was again full of displaced persons. The population of the original ORC has
fluctuated from a peak of 35,000 in the early 1990s to a low of about 5,000 in
1993. In March 1999, the ORC at Madhu hosted some 10,000 refugees, and by
July 2002, the population had declined only slightly despite the signing of a
ceasefire agreement between the government and LTTE in February 2002.
These changes illustrate the radical shifts generating displacement in the North,
especially in areas close to the frontlines.
Madhu's tradition as a sanctuary and sacred site of pilgrimage continues. In
July 2002, the LTTE reached an unprecedented agreement with the
Government through the Church authorities, allowing unarmed soldiers in
civilian clothing to access Madhu shrine. The Bishop of Mannar responsible
for Madhu reported in November 2002 that the number of pilgrims who
attended the July and August festivals in2002 approximated 300,000, and that
crowds of up to 2,000 people, mainly from the South, visit the shrine weekly.
Conditions prior to 1983 allowed reasonably unfettered access to Madhu
shrine for pilgrims, attracting 150,000 and 200,000, on average, visiting in July
and August respectively. This number dropped significantly after 1983, when
the LTTE controlled the area surrounding Madhu. Nonetheless, those within
this catchment area, some 30,000-50,000 people, still visited Madhu for the
nine-day festivals held on 2 July and 15 August during the years of conflict
(Bishop of Mannar, personal correspondence, 26 November). Hence, Madhu
has a long history of pilgrimage both prior to, and during, the conflict in Sri
Lanka.
In contrast to Srebrenica, the ORC at Madhu has operated relatively safely
for more than a decade, despite occasional evictions and security incidents.
Unlike the preventive zone in Somalia, this safe space has attracted internally
displaced persons seeking safety, thus meeting its objectives. The ORC at
Madhu is successful, in part, because it builds upon local arrangements of
sanctuary and safety. The identity of Madhu as a place has evolved over
centuries, and has been politically negotiated at a local level, Despite being
recognized by UNHCR, Madhu is first and foremost a shrine and pilgrimage
site with local and national connotations. No military force has been required
to patrol the borders of such space, despite occasional incursions.
Concluding Remarks: Whose Safety?
This paper has discussed the antecedents and outcomes of safe areas in three
war zones. It has specifically not addressed the (often politicized) state-
sponsored efforts to create 'humanitarian zones' in Kosovo, 'safe towns' in
Chechnya, or regroupment camps in Burundi, where the state is an aggressor
and has a strong interest in controlling the movements of marginalized or
minority citizen groups. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note these efforts to
mimic the international humanitarian discourse, even where conflicts of
interest are clear: the majority of these protected areas-whether designated by
multilateral organizations like the UN or national governments at war with
certain segments of their own population-are highly politicized zones where
declared intent and actual meaning can be two very different things.
Safe spaces sponsored by the UN Security Council have met with mixed
results. The provision of UMTAF troops to Somalia in Decembet 1992
provided a sufficient aura of protection to allow the UN Secretary General to
ask UNHCR to create the preventive zone in Southern Somalia. The good
intentions of UN Security Council resolution 824 in May 1993 generated,
among others, the safe city of Srebrenica. In neither case, were local
inhabitants or the parties to the conffict consulted. Whereas the preventive
zone in Somalia was a largely ineffectual political palliative, the IJN-protected
area of Srebrenica was punitive for the displaced persons who sought refuge
there. Preventive, palliative, and punitive, the safe havens declared by the UN
Security Council saved some lives but failed to protect all that they had
promised. What are the policy implications of these various experiments in
creating security zones and safe spaces?
While the absence of UN peacekeeping forces and UN political involvement
was lamented in Sri Lanka at the inception of the open relief centres (Clarance
1993), the autonomous arrangements afforded by this situation proved
advantageous in providing relief and real protection to displaced persons.
Militarized safe havens appear to be a contradiction in terms, even when the
armed forces are UN peacekeepers. With the exception of Northern Iraq, such
militarized arrangements have proven costly and ineffective. Moreover, the
establishment of security zones in the first place may have an unintended, but
detrimental effect on the status of asylum: the danger is that such spaces are
viewed as a substitute for asylum (Chimni 1995). The establishment of safe
spaces is about the geopolitical interests of states before the safety of displaced
persons, as witnessed in the case of Iraq and ultimately Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Hence, every effort to develop appropriate measures that have the consent of
the warring parties should be made, leaving the UN Security Council as the last
and least desirable venue for decisions on the establishrnent of safe space. The
Security Council has always been a venue for the debate and negotiation of
state security; the protection of internally displaced persons is a secondary
consideration in this context.
The rules of war and the safe spaces they create, as inscribed in humanitarian
law, are less and less relevant as warring factions ignore these consensual
arrangements. Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica assisted Bosnian Serbs in
creating lists of men of fighting age, believing Serb clairns that those detained
would be questioned as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions. In the end, these lists were used to systematize the murder of
between sevetr and eight thousand Bosnian Muslim men (Leopold 1999). The
Geneva Conventions focus on the treatment of combatants in war when they
are wounded or captured by enemy forces, and on the protection of civilians.
Increasingly, those affected by war are civilians. Whereas most casualties at the
turn of the nineteenth century occurred among soldiers at the battlefront,
civilian deaths and injuries constituted 60 to 80 per cent of casualties at the end
of the twentieth century (Boutwell and Klare 2000: 52). Other estimates are as
high as 90 per cent (Weiss 1999). Humanitarian law and its provisions may
create some useful protected spaces for civilians and wounded combatants, but
they are by no means sufficient.
While international humanitarian law is built upon consent in the
agreements warring factions forge, there is another distinct scale of negotiating
consent in the context of conflict. Consent is not only contractual, in the legal
sense, but it is politically constituted through structures of civil society, and in
the case of the ORC at Madhu, through places of pilgrimage and worship.
Before the war in Sri Lanka, Madhu was a sanctuary; this tradition continues
today, albeit in a more formalized manner. The oRC was constituted in a
geographical location already inscribed with local connotations of peace. It
was built upon this history of sanctuary in Madhu, extending its meaning from
a local and national scale to an international one. Sporadic violence, even dt
Madhu, underscores the fact that all safe spaces within conflict zones are
politicized; none is likely to be as neutral as a designated refugee camp in a
third country.
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Refugees fleeing Rwanda to [thenl 7-aire werc accompanied by a number of
perpetrators of the genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda. Ample evidenoe that these
perpetrators held refugees in the camps hostage to their wishes has generated much
soul-searching among humanitarian organizations that operated in 7ahe.
Concern was raised that the methodology employed by the group placed
humanitarian actors 'in the compromising position of assuming the role of an
obligor under human rights law, a role which [it was emphasized] states alone should
play. . . humanitarian actors could adopt an analytical metholodgy that drew from
human rights discourse without undermining the legal obligations of states or
purporting to assume the role of obligors' (UN OCHA 1999: l3).
The significance of timing, geography, and the political dimensions of humanitarian
activities were acknowledged, including a geopolitical analysis of escape routes and
possible catchrnent areas for Albanian Kosovars (UN OCHA 1999: 14-15).
Campbell notes that few academic discussions mention ethnic breakdown. My own
reading of this is that academic analyses tend to situate the roots of conflict in
nationalism, whereas the media have often rendered the problem as'ethnic'. In a
1992 study commissioned by the Bosnian presidency, over l0 per cent (56,473) of
Sarajevo's population still called themselves Yugoslavs, despite the violence. Bosnia
had the highest percentag€ of those who self-identified as Yugoslavs in the national
census. Glenny (1992: 142) argues that the move from people identifying as'Bosnian'
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
to identifying as Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, or Bosnian Muslim was the initial
step to war in the republic.
Like the Muslims of Sri Lanka, the Slav Muslims of Bosnia ar€ one of the few
nations in the world who are nominally identified by their religion and not their
language or ethnicity. Bosnian Muslims were recognized as a constituent nation, and
not just a minority, within Yugoslavia in 1971, and enshrined in the constitution in
1974 under Tito's rule (Glenny 1992).
Between luly 1992 and January 1996, UNHCR coordinated the longest running
humanitarian airlift in history. It surpassed the Berlin airlift in duration, providing
more than 12,000 flights and medical evacuation for over 1,100 casualties of the war
(Cutts 1999).
This removal of refugees was understood by many political analysts and media
commentators as a political move. The government could be looked upon
favourably in provincial elections held in April after the gains of Operation Rana
Gosa II. As well, Catholic.s in the south of Sri Lanka could look forward to the
possibility of attending the annual festivals once again, which had been inacoessible
while the surrounding area was controlled by the LTTE. The government was duly
re+lected in December.
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